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Abstract
Background: The Republic of Ireland has the second highest incidence of BSE worldwide. Only a
single case of vCJD has been identified to date.
Methods: We estimate the total future number of clinical cases of vCJD using an established
mathematical model, and based on infectivity of bovine tissue calculated from UK data and on the
relative exposure to BSE contaminated meat.
Results: We estimate 1 future clinical case (95% CI 0 – 15) of vCJD in the Republic of Ireland. Irish
exposure is from BSE infected indigenous beef products and from imported UK beef products.
Additionally, 2.5% of the Irish population was exposed to UK beef through residing in the UK
during the 'at-risk' period. The relative proportion of risk attributable to each of these three
exposures individually is 2:2:1 respectively.
Conclusions: The low numbers of future vCJD cases estimated in this study is reassuring for the
Irish population and for other countries with a similar level of BSE exposure.
Background
Public faith in the worldwide scientific community suf-
fered significantly after the announcement in 1996 that a
new variant form of CJD was affecting the British public
[1]. This almost certainly arose as a consequence of eating
BSE-infected beef [1-4]. Entry of an estimated 818,000 cat-
tle into the human food chain in Great Britain [5,6] gave
rise to concern that a significant proportion of the popu-
lation may have been exposed to contaminated material.
Initial estimates of the potential size of any vCJD epi-
demic were hampered by lack of knowledge of both the
incubation period distribution and the infectiousness of
BSE-infected cattle to humans (the species barrier) [7].
Uncertainties regarding these two key parameters resulted
in very high initial estimates for the upper limit of any
potential epidemic size [7]. As the years progressed, and
the exponential rise in cases was not seen, it became pos-
sible to reduce the estimates for upper limits of any poten-
tial epidemic from millions in 1998[7], to 136,000 in
2000 [8], to 7000 in 2002 [9]. The most recent analysis of
the data from vCJD deaths from the end of 2002 has
shown that the epidemic in the UK has almost certainly
peaked. This has further reduced upper limits for future
cases in the UK to be no greater than 540 cases [10].
Ireland has the second highest incidence of BSE world-
wide [11]. Concerns regarding a possible vCJD epidemic
in Ireland have mirrored concerns in the UK, although
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any epidemic was always likely to be significantly lower as
a consequence of the lower incidence of BSE.
To date one case of vCJD has been confirmed in the
Republic of Ireland [12]. It is not possible to construct epi-
demic scenarios in the Republic of Ireland based on this
case alone. However, since the epidemic in the UK
appears to have peaked, it has allowed some key uncer-
tainties to be determined with greater accuracy, namely,
the infectiousness of bovines to humans and the incuba-
tion period distribution, by fitting an established and well
described model to the UK data [7,8]. Knowledge of these
two key parameters, allows us to determine the risk to the
Irish population once the relative rates of BSE exposure
between Ireland and the UK have been established.
The aim of this study is to estimate the future number of
cases of vCJD in Ireland based on exposure to BSE-
infected meat and meat products produced in Ireland,
those imported to Ireland from the UK, and those con-
sumed by Irish citizens whilst visiting the UK. Our analy-
sis use established models which estimate the average
number of vCJD cases arising from one infected bovine in
the UK to translate the relative risk in the Republic of Ire-
land compared to the UK into estimates of future cases.
Methods
Exposure to the BSE agent in Ireland
Exposure of the Irish population to contaminated meat
occurred chiefly via three separate routes, a) consumption
of contaminated Irish meat in Ireland, b) consumption of
contaminated UK meat imported to Ireland and c) con-
sumption of contaminated UK meat by Irish people in the
UK.
BSE Epidemic in Ireland
There have been 1,224 positive BSE cases identified in Ire-
land (as of April 2003, [13]). The number of positive cases
identified has been increasing in recent years, with 329
positive cases in 2002. This increase has been attributed to
the BSE Targeted Active Surveillance Programme which
began in 2000, and since Jan 2001, all cattle over 30
months for human consumption, all casualty animals,
and all cattle greater than 24 months which die on farm
(so called fallen stock) must be tested for BSE using a
'rapid test' approved by the Scientific Steering Committee
of the European Commission. Over 1.5 million cattle
have been tested in this manner since 2000.
Estimates of the numbers of total BSE-infected animals
infected in Ireland are based on results from a back-calcu-
lation model fit to the reported clinical cases [14]. These
estimates are directly comparable to the estimates of the
number of BSE-infected cattle in the UK used to assess the
risk of the vCJD epidemic in the UK [7-9]. Figure 1 shows
the estimated number of infected animals slaughtered for
human consumption in Great Britain (GB), Northern Ire-
land (NI), and The Republic of Ireland between 1985 and
1996. Approximately 22,000 cattle were estimated to have
been infected with BSE in Ireland over this period, com-
pared to approximately 818,000 over the same period in
GB and 9,500 in NI[6,14,15]. Our figures for total BSE
cases in GB, NI and the Republic of Ireland are represent-
ative of the relative level of BSE exposure in Ireland com-
pared to the UK, as all figures above were calculated using
the same methodology. It is this relative level of exposure
between the two countries that is used in our calculations.
The total GB figure has been recalculated subsequently,
and it is now estimated that 2 million cattle were infected
in total in GB [16]. This increase did not affect the esti-
mates for vCJD epidemic size in the UK as the prediction
methods fitted to observed vCJD mortality data, and not
to the absolute magnitude of past human exposure to
BSE-infected cattle [16].
Irish Beef Exports
Due to the limited size of the domestic market, the Irish
Beef Industry exports up to 90 per cent of its annual out-
put [17]. Only 10 per cent of domestically produced beef
is therefore consumed in Ireland. Thus, 2,200 domestic
BSE infected cattle 'equivalents' are estimated to have
entered the food chain for consumption in Ireland.
Irish Beef Imports
Data on beef imports were obtained from three sources;
Customs and Excise in the UK, DEFRA in the UK and the
Central Statistics Office in Ireland. These figures did not
match precisely which may be as a result of different clas-
sification systems (table 1). We used the UK DEFRA &
Customs and Excise figures, as this allowed us to estimate
the proportion of UK-produced beef and beef products
exported to Ireland, which was a parameter in the model.
The UK exports approximately 20% of its total beef pro-
duced. It was estimated that 8% of all UK exports are sent
to Ireland (table 2). Of this 35% is from GB and the
remaining 65% from NI (table 1), which experienced a
BSE epidemic approximately 1% the size of the epidemic
in GB [10]. This trade is complicated by a number of addi-
tional considerations. Firstly an estimated 50% of these
imports are processed for subsequent export out of Ire-
land [17]. And secondly, some of these imports are prod-
ucts that were initially sent over from Ireland to the UK for
processing, or came from non-UK sources. The proportion
of imports from the UK originating from non-UK sources
was calculated by reviewing the export data from 1996
onwards following the export ban imposed on UK beef.
This ban was modified in 1998, with a provision to export
beef under specific conditions, but very little was felt to
have actually taken place. The amount of UK beef imports
identified during this time period (average 1439 tonnes/BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28
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Estimated number of infected animals slaughtered for human consumption in a) GB and b) Republic of Ireland / Northern  Ireland Figure 1
Estimated number of infected animals slaughtered for human consumption in a) GB and b) Republic of Ireland / Northern 
IrelandBMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28
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yr 1997–2000), was therefore felt to be representative of
the baseline level of non-UK beef as a proportion of total
UK beef imported to Ireland (average 15,729 tonnes/ yr
1988–1995). Therefore approximately 9% of Irish
imports from the UK were from non-UK scources. Of the
remaining 91%, half was subsequently exported, leaving
45.5% of UK exports ultimately consumed in Ireland.
Thus 45.5% of the 8% of total UK exports which make up
20% of total beef and beef products produced each year in
the UK reach and are consumed in Ireland. Total BSE
exports to the Republic of Ireland was therefore 0.26% of
UK total (20%*8%*45.5%*(35% + (65%*1%)) =
0.26%). Assuming that 827 500 BSE infected cattle were
slaughtered for consumption in the GB and NI, 2,148 'cat-
tle equivalents' would have been exported and ultimately
consumed in Ireland. These approximations do not take
into account the timing of the SBO bans which were intro-
duced in 1989 in the UK and 1996 in Ireland. They are
taken into account in the mathematical model however.
Travel to the UK
The Irish Blood Transfusion Service initiated a nationwide
survey of both donors and the general public in 2000 and
2001 to estimate the proportion of the Irish population
that had spent time in the UK during the 'at-risk' years
1980–1996 [18]. The results are shown in figure 2. In total
3687 people were surveyed, 2684 donors and 1003 from
the general population. Five percent of the Irish popula-
tion spent five years or more in the UK during this time
period. A further 5–6% spent between 6 months to 5 years
during the same time frame, and a further 11% spending
between 2–6 months. It was calculated therefore that
2.5% of the exposed Irish population (112,500) were
present in the UK at any given time, and therefore were
exposed to the UK risk. This represents approximately
0.16% of the UK risk (minus 20% exports) or 1082 'ani-
mal equivalents'.
vCJD epidemic in the UK
121 deaths due to vCJD had been diagnosed in the UK by
the 31 December 2002 http://www.doh.gov.uk\cjd. The
median age at onset of symptoms is 26 years, and at death
28 years. The excess of cases in younger individuals, com-
pared with what would have been expected in a random
sample of the population, suggests that younger individu-
als are either more susceptible to infection, were exposed
to a greater extent, and/or have shorter incubation
periods.
All cases tested to date are methionine (MM) homozygous
at codon 129 of the prion protein (PrP) gene [19].
Approximately 40% of the Caucasian population share
this genetic trait, with 13% valine homozygous and the
remaining 47% heterozygous [20,21]. Whilst it is possible
that other genotypes are also susceptible to vCJD (and are
either less susceptible than the MM genotype, or have
longer incubation periods), at present we have no cases
with which to constrain potential epidemic scenarios
among these other genotypes. Our model predictions are
therefore limited to the 40% of the known susceptible
population with the MM genotype. We additionally
assume that these populations are equally susceptible to
infection. A recent analysis of the codon 129 status in Ire-
land has identified 34% of the population to be MM
homozygous (n = 203). This did not differ significantly
from the UK figure (Nurmi et al. unpublished).
Preliminary results from testing appendix tissues for the
presence of abnormal PrP in the UK showed 1 positive
appendix in a sample of 8318 tissues [22]. The majority of
tissues tested (70%) were from the 20–29 age group (with
Table 1: Exports to RoI from GB and NI
Exports to RoI (1988–95) From GB From NI
Customs & Excise UK 15, 729 tonnes / year
Central Statistics Office RoI 16 472 tonnes / year 5782 tonnes / year (35%) 10 690 tonnes / year (65%)
Table 2: UK exports to the Republic of Ireland. (Units thousand tones. Scource DEFRA, C&E UK)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 average
UK consumption 789 806.1 858.8 871 808.4 675.9 653.7 667.6 766.3
Total exported 133 152.3 122.3 134.2 141.1 172.7 259.1 303.3 177.2
Exported to RoI 11.379 16.552 9.185 11.015 17.981 7.945 22.491 29.284 15.7BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28
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the remaining tissues restricted to the 10–50 age-group),
and all were removed between 1995 and 1999. The obser-
vation translates to an estimated detectable prevalence of
120 per million with 95% confidence interval 0.5–892
per million across the whole sample [22]. We assume in
our analyses that the positive appendix arose from an
MM-homozygous individual.
Statistical model
To obtain confidence intervals for the expected number of
future cases of vCJD in the Republic of Ireland, we fit a
survival model to the vCJD deaths recorded in the UK to
the end of 2002.
Full details of the model and fitting procedure for the UK
have previously been published. The number of cases in
country  i  at time u  and age a  is given by
 where Si(a) is the survival probability in country i in the
absence of infection, f(u) is the incubation period distri-
bution,  βj  is the transmission coefficient in country j
(which is country specific reflecting the different number
of animals consumed per person), Bi(u-a) is the number
of individuals born at time u-a in country i and δj is the
proportion of the population exposed to risk in country j.
The exposure hazard for country j is given by
Here νj(t) is the country-specific effectiveness of control
measures at reducing the amount of infectious material
entering the food supply over time, g(a) an age-dependent
susceptibility/exposure function (which is assumed to be
independent of the country), Ω(z) the relative infectious-
ness of bovines over the course of their incubation period
and wk(z,t) wk(z,t) the proportion of cattle slaughtered at
time t and time z away from disease onset in country k and
qjk the proportion of beef and beef products in country k
that are consumed by those in country j (either through
import/export or through travel). The average number of
cases arising from consumption of one maximally infec-
tious bovine is given by
and is used to calculate the transmission coefficient for
Ireland (βIRL) from the estimated parameter in the UK
model (βUK).
Time spent by Irish population in UK 1980 – 1996 (reproduced with permission from the Irish Blood Transfusion Board) Figure 2
Time spent by Irish population in UK 1980 – 1996 (reproduced with permission from the Irish Blood Transfusion Board).
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The model is fitted using maximum likelihood methods
to the time- and age-stratified vCJD deaths in the UK to
the end of 2002 assuming that the data arise from a Pois-
son distribution. The individual cases are categorised into
cells with at least 5 observations in each cell. The best-fit
point is that which maximises the log likelihood (LnL), or
equivalently minimises
where x0(u,a) are the observed cases at time u and age a in
the UK. For any model parameter, maximum likelihood
confidence intervals are obtained using likelihood ratio
tests. Non-linear optimisation techniques are used to fit
the model (23) using custom-written code. An intensive
search of parameter space was performed, fitting from
multiple starting points and restricting parameter bounds,
to ensure that the best-fitting models were obtained.
Confidence intervals for the expected number of cases are
obtained by re-parameterising the model so that the
expected number of cases between times u1 and  u2 in
country i is a model parameter. Prediction intervals are
obtained by adding Poisson variability to the confidence
intervals on the mean.
The model is additionally fitted to the prevalence data
obtained from a recent survey of appendix tissues. As the
study was interrupted due to the observation of a positive
appendix, the 95% confidence interval for the prevalence
of infection in the population is obtained from the likeli-
hood term for a negative binomial distribution. The
reported results arise from 9 batches with the positive
result arising in the sixth batch. The likelihood for this
result (assuming a binomial distribution for the sixth
batch conditional on having observed a positive result
and for the final three batches) is therefore given by
where pi is the expected prevalence in batch i, ni is the
number of samples in batch i and xi is the number of pos-
itive appendixes in batch i. The expected prevalence at
time u in age-group a is given by
The expected prevalence in batch i is calculated from this
expression as the average prevalence in the age-group over
the period of time from which the samples were collected.
The model fit is then judged by the combination of the
Poisson likelihood fit to the cases and the likelihood fit to
the prevalence data. As both the sensitivity and specificity
of the diagnostic tests at different incubation stages are
unknown, we include an additional parameter which
specifies the proportion of the incubation period for
which the test is assumed to be fully sensitive (working
backwards from death), and assume that the test has no
sensitivity prior to this time. We also assume the test is
fully specific. Throughout we assume that the positive
appendix is from an MM-homozygous individual, but
that the 8318 tissues are representative of the general pop-
ulation (and hence 40% of these tissues are from MM-
homozygous individuals), and that individuals will go on
to develop disease.
Model parameters
To fully characterize the exposure of any country to BSE-
infected material, estimates of the numbers of infected
cattle slaughtered in all BSE-affected countries are
required. However, since the majority of BSE cases have
been observed in the UK, we simplify the model to
assume that the UK population was only exposed to BSE-
infected cattle from the UK. In addition, we assume that
the main exposure of the Irish population was to BSE-
infected cattle from Ireland and the UK. Estimates of num-
bers of infected animals in the UK were obtained from
previous analyses [5]. Estimates of the numbers of
infected animals in Ireland were obtained as detailed
above.
The effectiveness of the Specified Bovine Offal (SBO) ban
in 1989 in the UK was assumed to be anywhere between
0 and 100% effective, with this parameter fitted in the
model. A similar ban was implemented in the Republic of
Ireland in 1996. We assumed that this ban was 100%
effective.
Survival patterns in the UK and the Republic of Ireland
were estimated from census data. Other parameters for the
model are described in detail elsewhere.
Results
The total risk from indigenous Irish cattle is estimated as
2,200 BSE-infected animals. Exposure from imported beef
is estimated to be approximately 2148 animals. Exposure
translated into numbers of infected bovines for those
traveling to the UK is estimated to be approximately 1082
infected animal equivalents. The relative attributable risk
is therefore approximately 2:2:1 for exposure from Irish
risk from Irish BSE, risk from imported BSE from the UK
and exposure of the Irish population in the UK respec-
tively. The total estimated exposure is 5430 infected ani-
mal equivalents.
The relative BSE exposure in Ireland compared to the UK
is given by the ratio of the exposures in the two countries
(= 5430 / (818000 + 9500) * 0.8) and is hence estimated
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to be 0.8%. A simple estimate of the future number of
cases of vCJD in Ireland is therefore given by multiplying
this risk by the estimated future number of cases in the
UK. By adjusting for differences in the exposed popula-
tion size, the individual risk that an Irish person has rela-
tive to someone of similar age with similar beef
consumption in the UK is estimated to be 13% (relative
BSE exposure (= 0.8%) * exposed population differences (=
68,800,000/4,500,000 = 15.3) = 13%).
Table 3 shows the estimated future cases of vCJD in Ire-
land and their 95% confidence intervals. Our results indi-
cate that we should expect very few (1–2) further future
clinical cases of vCJD in Ireland. In the model fit to the
vCJD case data alone, the uncertainty in this estimate is
relatively reassuring with an upper bound of 15 future
cases. However, in the model fit additionally to the prev-
alence data from the UK study of appendixes, the uncer-
tainty in this estimate is greater. This uncertainty is due to
the wide range of prevalence estimates in the UK consist-
ent with the results in the appendix survey.
Discussion
A best estimate of between 1 and 2 future clinical cases of
vCJD countrywide is somewhat reassuring for the Irish
population. However, there are some limitations to the
analysis used in deriving this prediction.
Firstly, all vCJD patients to date have been homozygous
for methionine (MM) on codon 129 on the PRNP gene.
This represents approximately 40% of the Irish and UK
population. It is assumed in this analysis that the remain-
ing 60% of the population are not susceptible. However,
in patients with Kuru, those with different polymor-
phisms also developed the disease, but with a more pro-
longed incubation period [24]. It is also possible that this
may be the case with vCJD, however, this can only occur
if these genotypes have a longer incubation period or a
decreased susceptibility. These scenarios would both
result in a lower per-capita incidence of infection in peo-
ple of this genotype.
Secondly, this analysis assumes that the vCJD cases in the
UK were infected through consumption of BSE-infected
beef. Meat and bone meal, which was felt to be the source
of the BSE epidemic in cattle, was banned from the diet of
ruminants in 1988 in the UK and 1990 in Ireland. How-
ever, meat and bone meal was fed to other animals in Ire-
land until 2001, when an EU directive prohibited its use
in all animals intended for human consumption. While
there is no clear evidence that vCJD may be contracted
from other animals, it needs to be kept in mind that meat
and bone meal may have been fed to animals that entered
the human food chain in Ireland until 2001. It would be
inappropriate to assume that this certainly represents no
risk to human health. If so, any vCJD 'epidemic' may not
follow the pattern of the BSE epidemic precisely.
Our model estimates the total future number of 'clinical'
cases. However, it is not possible to estimate the number
of people who may be 'subclinical carriers' of the disease.
It is known that the infecting 'prion' proliferates in the
lymphoreticular tissue of the GIT, prior to neuroinvasion.
There is also concern that the disease may be present in
blood during the subclinical phase of the disease [25]. It
is unknown how many of these patients who carry the dis-
ease in this manner will eventually develop clinical symp-
toms and die of their disease. Considering the number of
people exposed to infected material, the possibility that
there may be a large number of people with subclinical
disease cannot be discounted. While these patients may
suffer no adverse effects themselves, they retain the possi-
bility of transmitting the disease to others, as a result of
iatrogenic transmission from surgical procedures, such as
tonsillectomy or appendicectomy, or as a result of blood
transfusion or receipt of blood products. The only
estimate of the prevalence of asymptomatic infection to
date is from a retrospective study of appendicectomies in
the UK, in which PrPsc was detected in a single appendix
specimen out of 8318 asymptomatic patients, giving a
subclinical detectable prevalence of 120 cases per million
in the UK [22]. The confidence intervals, however, for this
study were wide (0.5–892 cases / million). Fitting this
prevalence data to the model increases the upper bound
on the future number of vCJD cases in Ireland from 15 to
46, assuming that a patient with PrPsc identified in their
appendix will ultimately develop clinical disease. The
wide confidence intervals for the prevalence study on
which these figures are based [18], suggests that these esti-
mates should be interpreted cautiously.
Table 3: Estimate of the future incidence of vCJD (2003–2080) compared to the UK. Mean and 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
Fit to UK vCJD case data alone Fit to UK vCJD case data and UK prevalence data simultaneously
Republic of Ireland 0.8 (0–15) 2 (0–46)
UK 40 (9–540) 100 (10–2,600)
Fit of the model (-2LnL) 17.84 26.3BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28
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To ensure that we are identifying all vCJD cases, and also
to ensure that the disease is not entering the human pop-
ulation by a more surreptitious route (eg via different
animals, different strain of prion), it is of considerable
importance that the Irish CJD Surveillance Unit continue
to be notified of all possible cases of TSEs. This will allow
cases of vCJD to be picked up and correctly identified. It
will also ensure that other types of prion diseases are
within established normal limits. In Switzerland, the level
of sporadic CJD in 2001 was 2.5 times higher than
expected [26]. This has given rise to the suspicion that per-
haps they may be contracting a different form of BSE, or
that the disease may be entering the human population
from a different route. Support for this point of view has
been strengthened by a recent study in which mice inocu-
lated with BSE developed neuropathology sometimes
indistinguishable from sCJD [27].
The relative contribution of risk from indigenous Irish risk
from Irish BSE: risk from UK BSE imported to Ireland : risk
from Irish population in UK during at risk period is 2:2:1.
Currently the Irish Blood Transfusion Service (IBTS) has
banned donors who have spent 5 years or more in the UK
during the 'at-risk' period 1980–1996. This study indi-
cates that even if all potential donors who spent more
than 2 months in the UK were banned from donating
blood, it would still only represent 20% of the total vCJD
risk. Our estimate of 0–15 future clinical cases of vCJD
suggests that the risk to our blood stores is not as high as
was previously feared. However, this estimate increases to
0–46 cases when we use the subclinical study from the
UK. We cannot outrule the possibility that there may be
an even larger number of people that are subclinical carri-
ers of the disease, that could still potentially transmit the
disease via blood products. Attempts to establish a nation-
wide subclinical prevalence study by assessing tonsil tis-
sue for PrPres in Ireland have been slowed as a result of
ethical concerns regarding anonymous testing for a fatal
disease with a long incubation period. Our results
strongly suggest that the likelihood of identifying a posi-
tive sample would be quite small, and a large numbers of
tonsil specimens would be required to ensure that the
study would be statistically robust.
The development of a suitable blood test that would allow
screening of large numbers of the population would prove
extremely valuable in further quantifying the risk to the
Irish population to vCJD.
Conclusion
We estimate that there will be a small number of future
clinical cases of vCJD in Ireland as a consequence of pri-
mary exposure to BSE contaminated material. This is reas-
suring for the Irish population and to other countries that
have had a similar level of BSE exposure.
Competing interests
None declared.
Authors Contributions
MH - principal author, wrote manuscript, co-designed
study
AG - statistical analysis, co-designed mathematical model,
co-wrote manuscript
CD - calculated BSE statistics for Ireland / UK
RH - co-designed study
RMW - co-designed study
MW - co-designed study
FB - co-designed study
MF - initiated study, co-wrote manuscript
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Irish and UK Departments of Health for co-
funding this study. The views expressed in this publication are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Health.
References
1. Will RG, Ironside JW, Zeidler M, Cousens SN, Esteiboro K, Smith PG:
A new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet
1996, 347:921-25.
2. Bruce ME, Will RG, Ironside JW, McConnell I, Drummond D, Bos-
tock CJ: Transmissions to mice indicate that 'new-variant'
CJD is caused by the BSE agent. Nature 1997, 389:498-501.
3. Collinge J, Sidle K, Meads J, Ironside J, Hill AF: Molecular analysis
of prion strain variation and the aetiology of 'new-variant'
CJD. Nature 1996, 383:685-90.
4. Hill AF, Desbruslais M, Joiner S, Sidle K, Gowland I, Lantos P: The
same prion strain causes vCJD and BSE.  Nature 1997,
389:448-50.
5. Anderson RM, Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM, Woolhouse ME, Watt CJ,
Wells GA: Transmission dynamics and epidemiology of BSE
in British cattle. Nature 1996, 382:779-788.
6. Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Woolhouse M, Anderson RM: The epi-
demiology of BSE in cattle herds in Great Britain. II Model
construction and analysis of transmission dynamics. Phil Trans
R Soc Lond B 1997, 352:803-838.
7. Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Hagenaars TJ, Anderson RM:
Epidemiological determinants of the pattern and magnitude
of the vCJD epidemic in Great Britain. Proc R Soc Lond B 1998,
265:2443-2452.
8. Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Anderson RM: Predicted
vCJD mortality in Great Britain. Nature 2000, 406:583-4.
9. Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Anderson RM: Factors
determining the pattern of the vCJD epidemic in Great
Britain. Proc R Soc Lond B 2003, 270:689-698.
10. Ghani AC, Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM, Anderson RM: Updated
projections of future vCJD deaths in the UK. BMC Infect Dis
2003, 3:4.
11. OIE  [http://www.oie.int]
12. Molloy S, O'Laoide R, Brett F, Farrell M: The "Pulvinar" sign in
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.AJR. Am J Roentgenol 2000,
175:555-6.
13. DAFF  [http://www.irlgov.ie/daff]
14. BSE Review  [http://www.bsereview.org.uk/data/
bse_in_ireland.htm]Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28
Page 9 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
15. Ferguson NM, Ghani AC, Donnelly CA, Denny GO, Anderson RM:
BSE in Northern Ireland: epidemiological patterns past,
present and future. Proc R Soc Lond B 1998, 265:545-554.
16. Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM, Ghani AC, Anderson RM: Implications
of BSE infection screening data for the scale of the British
BSE epidemic and current European infection levels. Proc R
Soc Lond B 2002, 269:2179-90.
17. Beef imports on the Irish market: An Bord Bia Report. Dublin 2001.
18. Donor & General Public Surveys for Irish Blood Transfusion Service:
Drury Research. Dublin 2001.
19. The National CJD Surveillance Unit: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
surveillance in the UK. Western General Hospital, Edinburgh 2002.
20. J Collinge, MS Palmer, AJ Dryden: Genetic predisposition to
iatrogenic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.  Lancet 1991,
337:1441-1442.
21. F Owen, M Poulter, J Collinge, TJ Crow: Codon 129 changes in the
prion protein gene in Caucasians. American Journal of Human
Genetics 1990, 46:1215-1216.
22. Hilton DA, Ghani AC, Conyers L, Edwards P, McArlde L, Ironside JW:
Accumulation of prion protein in tonsil and appendix: review
of tissue samples. BMJ 2002, 325:633-34.
23. WH Press, SA Teukolsky, WT Vetterling, BP Flannery: Numerical Rec-
ipes in C - The Art of Scientific Computing 2nd edition. Cambridge: CUP;
1992. 
24. Cervenakova L, Goldfarb LG, Garruto R, Lee HS, Gajdusek DC,
Brown P: Phenotype-genotype studies in kuru: implications
for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 1998, 95(22):13239-41.
25. Hunter N, Foster J, Chong A, McCutcheon S, Parnham D, Houston F:
Transmission of prion diseases by blood transfusion. J Gen Virol
2002, 83:2897-905.
26. Glatzel M, Rogivue C, Ghani AC, Streffer JR, Amsler L, Aguzzi A: Inci-
dence of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Switzerland.  Lancet
2002, 360:139-41.
27. Asante AE, Linehan JM, Desbruslais M, Joiner S, Gowland I, Collinge J:
BSE prions propogate as either vCJD-like or sCJD-like prion
strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein.
EMBO 2002, 21:6358-6366.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/28/prepub